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A.

DEFENDANT'S REPRESENTATION AT TRIAL WAS INEFFECTIVE
ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL, WHERE COUNSEL'S REPRESENTATION
FELL BELOW AN OBJECTIVE STANDARD OF REASONABLENESS
RESULTING IN PREJUDICE TO THE DEFENDANT;
Point No. 1.

AT TRIAL, DEFENSE COUNSEL FAILED TO
SPECIFICALLY OBJECT TO THE INTRODUCTION
OF PARAPHERNALIA SEIZED IN KACSUTA'S
APARTMENT.

Point No. 2.

DEFENSE COUNSEL FAILED TO
MANDERA IN DEFENSE'S CASE.

Point No. 3.

DEFENSE COUNSEL FAILED TO CHALLENGE THE
STATE'S CLAIM OF MARIJUANA RESIDUE ON THE
PpCKET KNIFE AND IN THE.PIPE BOWL.

Point No. 4.

DEFENSE COUNSEL FAILED TO REQUEST THAT
THE CAUTIONARY INSTRUCTION GIVEN BY THE
COURT,,,, REGARDING KACSUTA'S PRIOR BAD
CHARACTERISE GIVEN ALSO AS A WRITTEN
INSTRUCTION TO THE JURY.

Point No. 5.

DEFENSE COUNSEL FAILED TO REQUEST A MORE
DEFINITIVE INSTRUCTION ON THE ISSUE OF
INTENT TO DISTRIBUTE.

Point No. 6.

DEFENSE COUNSEL FAILED TO CALL WITNESSES
OR INTRODUCE EVIDENCE AS TO KACSUTA'S

CALL

MATT

EMPLOYMENT.
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Point No. 7.

DEFENSE COUNSEL FAILED TO CALL AS
WITNESSES THOSE PRESENT IN KACSUTA'S
APARTMENT AT THE TIME OF HIS ARREST.

Point No. 8.

DEFENSE COUNSEL FAILED TO REQUEST THE
LESSER
INCLUDED INSTRUCTION ON THE
OFFENSE OF ATTEMPTED POSSESSION OF A
CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE WITH INTENT TO
DISTRIBUTE.

THE TRIAL COURT ERR0!« IN REFUSING TO. GRANT KACSUTA'S
MOTION TO SUPPRESS, IN PARTICULAR, WITH REGARD TO
TESTIMONY OF KACSUTA'S BAD1 CHARACTER, WHERE SUCH WAS
REMOTE, CONFUSED THE ISSUES, MISLEAD THE JURY AND/OR WAS
CUMULATIVE.
Point No. 1

BY ALLOWING THE TESTIMONY OF PRIOR
CRIMINAL ACTIVITY, THE!;COURT CREATED A
BREEDING GROUND FOR CONFUSION OF THE
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WITH - THE INCOMPLETE « ) AND
INADEQUATE
CAUTIONARY INSTRUCTION, THE TESTIMONY AT
TRIAL' HAD ' A
HIGH ' PROBABILITY
OF
MISLEADING THE JURY TO BELIEVE THAT THE
PRIOR CRIMINAL WAS RELATED TO THE EVENTS
OF KACSUTA'S ARREST BEYOND THE ISSUE OF
INTENT.

Point No. 3.

THE TESTIMONY REGARDING KACSUTA'S PRIOR
ACTIVITIES WAS REMOTE. HOWEVER, THERE
WAS NO FURTHER INSTRUCTION! GIVEN AS TO
THE WEIGHT AND SUFFICIENCY OF THE
EVIDENCE.

Point No. 4.

THE STATE OF UTAH HAD OTHER MEANS AT IT'S
DISPOSAL FOR ESTABLISHING INTENT AND THE
EVIDENCE ALLOWED TO BE ADMITTED BY THE
COURT WAS IN FACT CUMULATIVE AND REFERRED
TO SPECIFIC CRIMINAL ACTS.

C.

THERE WAS INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO CONVICT THE DEFENDANT
ON POSSESSION OF A CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE WITH INTENT TO
DISTRIBUTE, A SECOND DEGREE FELONY.

D.

THE COURT ERRED IN NOT REDUCING JUDGMENT OF CONVICTION AT
THE TIME OF SENTENCING.

CONCLUSION
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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OP UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
vs.

:
:
:

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

:

JARED C. KACSUTA,

l

Case No.

Defendant and Appellant.

;

Priority No. 2

940353-CA

0

•

^

__^_____J

______

JURISDICTION OF THE COURT
The jurisdiction of the Court is established by 78-2a-3(2)(f),
Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended, Rule 26(2)(a), Utah Rules of
Criminal Procedure, and Rule 3, Utah Rules of Appellant Procedure.
NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS
This appeal is from a final Judgment and Sentence finding the
Defendant/Appellant-(hereafter "KACSUTA") guilty of POSSESSION OF
A CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE WITH INTENT, TO DISTRIBUTE, a Second Degree
Felony, in violation of Section 58-37-8(1)(a)(iv) and 58-378(5)(a)(ix) and (x) and 58-37-8(5)(c), Utah Code Annotated, 1953,
as amended, the Judgment being entered after a Jury Trial and
ordering KACSUTA to be committed to the Utah State Prison.

1

ISSUES FOR REVIEW AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
J\ 9

WHETHER OR NOT THE DEFENDANT/APPELLANT RECEIVED
INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL.
The Standard of Review requires the Defendant to show, first,
that his counsel's

rendered

a deficient performance

in some

demonstrable manner and/or that his counsel's performance fell
below an objective standard of reasonable professional judgment
and, second, that counsel's performance prejudiced the Defendant.
Bundv v, Deland, 763 P.2 803,805 (Utah 1988).
B.
WHETHER OR NOT THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO GRANT
DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO SUPPRESS OR LIMIT AT TRIAL.
C.
WHETHER OR NOT THERE WAS SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO
SUPPORT THE JURY'S VERDICT.
The Standard of Review requires a review of the evidence and
all inferences that may reasonably be drawn from the evidence in a
light most favorable to a jury verdict, and requiring reversal only
when the evidence is sufficiently inconclusive or so inherently
improbable that reasonable minds must have had a doubt. State vs.
Verde. 770 P.2 616,617 (Utah 1989).
D,
WHETHER OR NOT THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO GRANT
DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR REDUCTION,,OF JUDGMENT AT FINAL SENTENCING.
The Standard of Review is whether or not the Trial Court
abused it's discretion.

State v. Archuleta, 850 P.2 1232 (Utah

1993).
2

DETERMINATIVE STATUTE and/or RULES
The statutory and regulatory provisions which are believed to
be determinative in this matter include Utah Code Annotated,
Section 58-37-8(1)(a)(iv) and 58-37-8(5)(a)(ix) and (x) and 58-378(5)(c), 1953, as amended.

Utah Rulejs of Evidence, Sections 401,

403, 404(b) and 803(15) and (24).
MATURE OF THE CASE
KACSUTA's conviction results from his arrest on March 17,
1994.

KACSUTA was in his apartment with several friends, some of

whom were juveniles. KACSUTA's probation officer, RODNEY SEYMOUR,
made an unannounced visit, took KACSUTA into the hall and searched
him.

KACSUTA had been a week late in reporting to the probation

department for the month of March. The search of KACSUTA's person
turned up three baggies of marijuana in varying quantities, 5.2
grams, 2.8 grams and 0.4 grams.

KACSUTA also had Fifty-Eight

($58.00) Dollars in cash on his person.
Later, KACSUTA's apartment was searched by Beaver City Police
Officers RUSSELL L. ERICKSON and CAMERON NOEL. They found a pocket
knife, two parts of a disassembled pipe, namely the bowl and
screen, a clip, scales, and marijuana stem and seeds. KACSUTA was
not charged with possession of drug paraphernalia. However, he was
charged with POSSESSION OF A CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE WITH THE INTENT
TO

DISTRIBUTE, a

SecO^ „, ®f$qtMm itf^lony and

CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE,

POSSESSION

OF A

mmilMmmMm**nor.

A preliminary he&WMMMmm&m

19th day of April, 1994,

and KACSUTA was bound ovir"arfTJTOP'Fduhts for jury trial. KACSUTA
3

was appointed the Public Defender to represent him.
day of June, 1994*

On the 17th

KACSUTA's appointed counsel moved to suppress

or limit evidence generated from KACSUTAFs arrest and the search of
his apartment.

Said motion was particular in moving to suppress

evidence of KACSUTA's bad character, such as prior criminal conduct
and/ot prior use of marijuana. KACSUTA's motion was denied and the
evidence was introduced at trial.
dn the 19th day of July, 1994, KACSUTA moved to reduce the
judgment of conviction and the same was denied by the Trial Court.
KACSUTA was sentenced to incarceration at the Utah State Prison
with no fine imposed and a recommendation that he be screened and
considered for drug treatment at the earliest possible time, while
in prison, as a condition of parole.
PROCEEDINGS and DISPOSITION AT TRIAL
KACSUTA was charged on Count I, POSSESSION OF A CONTROLLED
SUBSTANCE WITH INTENT TO DISTRIBUTE, a Second Degree Felony, in
violation of Section 58-37-8(1)(a)(iv), 58-37-8(5)(a)(ix) and (x)
and 58-37-8(5)(c), Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended, and Count
II, POSSESSION OF A CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE, a Class A Misdemeanor, in
violation of Section 58-37-8(2)(a)(i), 58-37-8(5)(a)(ix) and (x)
and 58-37-8(5)(c), Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended. KACSUTA
was appointed counsel and a preliminary hearing was held on the
19th day of April, 1994. KACSUTA ya<8 bqund over for jury trial on
both counts and the matMMIWMiiM^
June, 1994. On or a b o u ^ l i m ^

on the 22nd day of
1994, KACSUTA by and

through counsel, moved to ^ « O T ^
4

generated from

hitfl &nd search of his apartment.

This included a motion to

suppress testimony regarding KACSUTA's prior bad character.

The

Motion to Suppress was denied and the evidence was introduced at
trial.
At trial, KACSUTA was found guilty of COUNT I, POSSESSION OF
A CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE WITH INTENT TO DISTRIBUTE, a Second Degree
Felony. On or about the 17th day of July, 1994, KACSUTA moved for
reduction of judgment of conviction, and the same was denied by the
Court.

KACSUTA was sentenced to incarceration in the Utah State

Prison with no fine imposed and a recommendation that he be
screened and considered for drug treatment at the earliest point in
time, while in prison as a condition of parole.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On the evening of March 17, 1994, KACSUTA was at home in his
apartment,
television.

visiting
KACSUTA

with

his

brother

and

friends, watching

received an unannounced visit

probation officer, RODNEY SEYMOUR.

from his

Trial Transcript at 70.

At

4

that time, KACSUTA was under the supervision of Adult Probation and
Parole and was a week late in reporting to his probation officer
for the month of March.

Id at 70*

Those present in KACSUTA's

apartment that evening were, his brother, JASON KACSUTA, and some
friends, CODY R. BEAUMONT, JACKIE ERWIG, SHAWN HUTCHINGS, LESLIE
ABNER, and MATT MANDERA, one ors more of whom was under the age of
eighteen years.

Id at 122.

JASON GREENWOOD, JERRY PEREZ, and

SCOTT CLEMMONS, were not present in KACSUTA's apartment that
evening, but were called as witnesses at trial.
5

KACSUTA was conducted into the hall and his probation officer
performed a pat down search Of his person•

Id at 71• The officer

found three baggies of marijuana, id at 72, in various quantities,
respectively, 5.2 grams, 2.8 grams and 0.4 grams, id at 86,
together identified as State's Exhibit 1 at trial.

KACSUTA was

arrested and taken to the Beaver County Sheriff's Office.

Id at

72.
Sometime thereafter, KACSUTA's apartment was searched by
officers RUSSELL L, ERICKSON and CAMERON NOEL, and there was found
a pocket knife, parts of a disassembled pipe, namely the bowl and
screen, a clip, scales, and marijuana stem and seeds. Id at 96 and
111.

These officers further investigation disclosed that the

scales belonged to MATT MANDERA.

Id at 103 and 113.

KACSUTA was charged with Count I, POSSESSION OF A CONTROLLED
SUBSTANCE WITH INTENT TO DISTRIBUTE, a Second Degree Felony, and
Count

II, POSSESSION

Misdemeanor.

OF

A

CONTROLLED

SUBSTANCE, a

Class A

KACSUTA was never charged with POSSESSION OF DRUG

PARAPHERNALIA.
KACSUTA was appointed the public defender to represent him at
trial, and a preliminary hearing was held on the 19th day of April,
1994# whereat, KACSUTA was bound over for jury tjrjlal on both
counts. On the 17th day of June, 1994, KACSUTA, by and through his
appointed counsel, moved to suppress evidence from his arrest and
search of his apartment.

This included a motion to suppress

testimony of prior bad character, in particular evidence of any
sale or delivery of controlled substances by KACSUTA to SCOTT
6

CLEMMONS, or any other person prior to March 17, 1994*

The motion

was denied and the matter went to trial on the 22nd day of June,
1994.
At trial, KACSUTA's probation officer was called who testified
of the circumstances

incident

to his arrest of KACSUTA and

testified that he found three baggies and Fifty-Eight ($58.00)
Dollars in cash on KACSUTA's person.

The cash made the Probation

Officer suspicious because he believed that KACSUTA was unemployed.
Id at 68.
A criminologist was called who testified of his testing of the
three baggies

of

substance marked

at State's Exhibit

testified that the same was marijuana.

Id at 85.

1 and

There was no

evidence presented that the criminologist had tested or even
examined the items seized during the police officer search of
KACSUTA's apartment. Said police officer's, ERlCKSON and NOEL, of
the Beaver City Police Department, testified of their search of
KACSUTA's apartment and seizure of certain items and further
rendered unqualified opinions claiming that the blade of the pocket
knife and the bowl of the pipe contained marijuana residue.
100.

Id at

On cross examination Defense Counsel asked each officer if

MATT MANDERA had told them that he owned the scales found in
KACSUTA's apartment.

The officers stated that he had, but said

testimony was stricken upo#]ih#|fSfcM&!ft£ Objection on the grounds of
heresy.

Id at 103 and UIHHIIIHHI^^

items seized from K A C S U M l M ^

a witness* The
into evidence

without objection from Defense Coiiitfeell
7

T?he State called there witnesses who testified regarding
KACSUTA's bad character and/or previous dealings involving the use
of marijuana. CODY BEAUMONT who was under the age of eighteen and
present in KACSUTA's apartment on the evening of KACSUTA's arrest,
testified that he was not aware that KACSUTA had marijuana on his
person that evening, but that on an earlier occasion, some two to
three weeks prior, he had smoked some marijuana with KACSUTA in his
pickup truck.

Id at 124 and 125.

JERRY PEREZ testified that he

was not present on the evening of KACSUTA1's arrest, but on an
earlier occasion, some two to three weeks prior, had smoked
marijuana with KACSUTA at PEREZ'S apartment.

Id at 129*

SCOTT

CLEMMONS testified that he was not present on the evening of
KACSUTA's arrest, but that on an earlier occasion, some two to
three weeks prior, he had purchased a small quantity of marijuana
from KACSUTA.

Id at 132.

The testimony of these witnesses was argued in some detail and
the Court allowed the testimony as an exception to Rule 404(b) and
only with a cautionary instruction.

Said cautionary instruction

was given by the Court verbally to the jury at the time of
BEAUMONT'S testimony•

There was never any written instruction

given to the jury and was not repeated orally at the time of either
PEREZ'S or CLEMMONS's testimony.

confusing, misleading,

Said cautionary instruction was

un#M^^Mdyill<i#quate

1

Verbal C a u t J L M i ™ ^
given by t h e Court i s
found a t T r i a l Tra^iii||elliill•l•HnHlnlilliIlii^p r e a d s as f o l l o w s :
THE COURTS

Alright. L M I & r ^
you a r e going t o be
r e c e i v i n g some i n f o r m a t i o n
during t h i s
trial
relating
to
prior i acts
of
distribution
of
8

controlled substance by the Defendant.
You are
instructed that information is only relevant and is
only being admitted, in this case, on the issue of
the Defendant's intent with regard to the marijuana
that was found in his pocket as testified to by Mr.
Seymour on March 17, 1994. You're not to use that
information or consider that evidence in regard to
any other aspect of the case. You may not find the
Defendant, JARED KACSUTA, guilty of the offense
charged in this case, based solely on the evidence
that he may had distributed marijuana in the past.
The State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that
the Defendant intended to distribute the marijuana
he possessed, if any, on March 17, 1994. Evidence
indicating that he engaged in such conduct on some
other occasion may be considered by you as evidence
of his intent on March 17, 1994; However, you may
not enter a guilty verdict in this case if the
State fails to prove the elements of the offense or
offenses charged, even if you believe that he may
have committed a similar crime in the past.
KACSUTA called no witnesses in his defense and chose not to
testify himself.

He was found guilty on Count I, POSSESSION OF A

CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE WITH THE INTENT TO DISTRIBUTE, a Second Degree

Felony, on the 19th day of July, 1994, KACSUTA moved for reduction
of judgment of conviction and the same was denied by the Court.
KACSUTA was sentenced to incarceration at the Utah State Prison
with no fine imposed and a recommendation that he be screened and
considered for drug treatment at the earliest point in time while
in,prison as a condition of parole.
KACSUTA

initiated

his, own

appeal, asserting

ineffective

assistance of counsel and requested that the Court appoint him
successor counsel for purposes of the appeal. The attorney filing
this appeal was the attorney appointed by the Court at KACSUTA's
request and did not represent KACSUTA at trial.

9

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS

ARGUMENTS
Irk o

DEFENDANT'S REPRESENTATION AT TRIAL WAS INEFFECTIVE
ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL, WHERE COUNSEL'S REPRESENTATION FELL
BELOW AN OBJECTIVE STANDARD OF REASONABLENESS
RESULTING IN PREJUDICE TO THE DEFENDANT.
The Standard regarding ineffective assistance of counsel is
established in Stricklin v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688, 104
S.Ct. 2052, 2064 (1984).

Therein, the United States Supreme Court

stated that to establish an ineffective assistance of counsel
claim,

Defendant

must

show,

first, that

counsel

rendered

a

deficient performance that fell below the objective standard of
reasonable

professional

judgment

and,

second, that

deficient performance prejudiced the Defendant.

counsel's

Stricklin, 466

U.S. at 687, 104 S.Ct. at 2064.
In

showing

that

counsel

rendered

Defendant

deficient

performance, the burden is on the Defendant to demonstrate that
counsel's

representation

fell below an objection

standard of

reasonableness. Stricklin, 466 U.S. at 687-88, 104 S.Ct. at 2064.
In Salt Lake City v. Grotepas, 238 Utah Advanced Report 13 (Utah
App.

1994), the Utah Coturtu, o£hlAntb«»i»ls further qualified the

ineffective assistance o f M u i i M M t t s . f ,0 1. ,,s:
Ordinarily, still
:fective assistance of
counsel] may only m
collateral attack in
Habeas Corpus proceediA^^BSIiJlH,,S&,,,, the trial record is
insufficient to allow.the Claim to be determined on direct
10

appeal. (Citations omitted).
However, if the ineffective
assistance of counsel claim, is first raised on direct appeal

and Defendant's

appellant

counsel

was not also trial

counsel,

as in the case before us, w& may consider the issue only if
the record is adequate to permit a decision. If we address
the claim based on the record we must decide whether Defendant
was deprived of the effective assistance of counsel as a
matter of law. Nevertheless, out review of trial "counsel's"
performance must be highly differential; otherwise, the
"distorting effects of hindsight" would lead us to engage in
second guessing. Id at 14. See also State v. Garrett, 849
P.2d 578 (Utah App), cert denied, 860 P.2d 943 (Utah 1993);
see also, State v. Tennyson, 850 P.2d 461 (Utah App. 1993).
In the instant case, KACSUTA was appointed counsel at trial,
initiated his own appeal and requested the appointment of successor
counsel for appeal purposes and was appointed successor counsel for
that purpose.
While bound by the trial record, KACSUTA asserts that there
are factors indicating that his representation at trial fell below
the objective standard of reasonableness and created a reasonable
probability that the jury verdict would have been more favorable if
he had had more effective representation.
POINT NO. 1
AT TRIAL, DEFENSE COUNSEL FAILED TO SPECIFICALLY OBJECT TO THE
INTRODUCTION OF PARAPHERNALIA SEIZED IN KACSUTA'S APARTMENT.
After the Defendant was arrested and taken into custody, his
apartment was searched by Beaver City Police Officers RUSSELL L.
ERICKSON and CAMERON NOEL.

Said officers seized a pocket knife,

parts of a disassembled pipe, namely the bowl and screen, a clip,
scales, and marijuana steraf and j^feedg*

Defense Counsel did move to

suppress the evidence as a wa^tana|iy^|^ illegal search, which was
not incident to arrest. Howfe^W^VIFTfUl, Defense Counsel failed
to object to the items admissibility on grounds not raised in the
11

motion to suppress•

Namely, counsel could have objected to

relevancy, because KACSUTA had never been charged with possession
of drug paraphernalia.

Second, the Defense Counsel could have

objected to foundation, since ownership of the items was never
clearly established and ownership was at issue on at least one of
the items where testimony suggested that the scales belonged to
MATT HANDERA.

Third, Defense Counsel could have objected to the

representations made by the officers that the pocket knife and pipe
bowl contained marijuana residue, where there was no testimony
given by the State's criminologist suggesting that said items had
ever been examined or tested.
POINT NOo 2
DEFENSE COUNSEL FAILED TO CALL MATT MANDERA IN DEFENSE'S CASE.
KACSUTA asserts that the paraphernalia found in his apartment
and allowed to be introduced into evidence without objection was a
very damaging oversight.

Of those items seized and introduced as

evidence, the weighing scales were by far the most damaging
regarding the charge of POSSESSION OF A CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE WITH
INTENT TO DISTRIBUTE, a Second Degree Felony. The record indicated
that through the testimony of the officers, ERICKSON and NOEL, see
trial transcript at pages 103 and 113, that MATT MANDERA, stated
that he owned the scales. The state objected to this testimony as
heresy and the same was stt£ta£ttdd \Pt fP^P Court.
would have avoided the J U I U n H H I ( f e * < l
testify at trial.
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he

Defense Counsel

called

MANDERA to

Similarly, Defense Counsel should have argued the applicable
heresy exceptions. Rule 803(15)(Statements effecting interests in
property) and (24)(Other Exceptions, Statements offered as evidence
of material facts, more probative than other evidence which could
be produced through reasonable efforts and justice is best served
by their admission).

MANDERA was not called as a witness and no

exception was taken to the ruling on the State's objection and the
scales were submitted into evidence under an assumption that they
belonged to KACSUTA.
POINT NO. 3
DEFENSE COUNSEL FAILED TO CHALLENGE THE STATE'S CLAIM
OF MARIJUANA RESIDUE ON THE POCKET KNIFE AND IN THE PIPE BOWL.
As set forth above, no objection was made to the introduction
of paraphernalia found in KACSUTA's apartment. At trial, the State
simply had the Beaver City Police Officer's testify that the pocket
knife and pipe bowl had marijuana residue on them.

The State had

called a criminologist who had tested the substance found on
KACSUTA's person but did not testify of any testing of the residue
claimed to have been found on the knife and pipe bowl.

The

Defendant was not charged with possession of drug paraphernalia and
so the objection to relevancy spewed,,apprppriate.

However, there

was clearly, a challenge ^s to the officers' unqualified statements
that these items contained marijuana residue.

While Defense

Counsel had made a motion to suppress this evidence as having been
seized due to an illegal search, there was no specific objection
made at trial to the items' introduction on these or any other
grounds.
13

POINT NO, 4
DEFENSE COUNSEL FAILED TO REQUEST THAT THE CAUTIONARY
INSTRUCTION GIVEN BY THE COURT REGARDING KACSUTA'S PRIOR BAD
CHARACTER BE GIVEN ALSO AS A WRITTEN INSTRUCTION TO THE JURY.
As part of the State's case in chief, and for the purpose of
establishing KACSUTA's intent to distribute, the State introduced
character testimony of Defendant's prior dealings. This consisted
of the testimony of CODY BEAUMONT, JERRY PEREZ and SCOTT CLEMMONS.
CODY BEAUMONT testified that he didn't know the Defendant had
marijuana in his possession on the night of the arrest, but
testified that on a prior occasion, while chumming around with the
Defendant, he has smoked some marijuana with him.
JERRY PEREZ testified that prior to March 17, 1994, he had
smoked some marijuana with MATT MANDERA and the Defendant*
SCOTT CLEMMONS testified that on an earlier occasion he had
purchased a small amount of marijuana from the Defendant on one
occasion.
Defense counsel had moved to limit the testimony under Rule
404(b), Utah Rules of Evidence, as inadmissible to prove character
of a person in order to show that he acted in conformity therewith.
The trial court denied*the motion to supprqs^.asserting that
the testimony was relevant and that under Rule 4Q3, Utah Rules of
Evidence, the probative vqlue substantially outweighed the danger
of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues or misleading the
jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or
needless

presentation

of

cumulative

evidence.

The

Court's

determination regarding this issufe will be hereafter discussed,
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however, the Court did give an oral cautionary instruction to the
jury, see trial transcript, page 123, during the testimony of CODY
BEAUMONT.

There was no written instruction given even though the

Court indicated that it would give such an instruction*

Trial

Transcript at page 57. Defense Counsel should have insisted that
the cautionary instruction be, clearer as to which testimony it
would apply to, more complete and definitive as to how the evidence
should be treated by the jury and providing that the distribution
of marijuana in the past does not indicate that any possession of
marijuana in the future will be with the intent to distribute, that
the jury be advised at the same time that the Defendant has a
presumption

of

innocence

and

that

the

instruction

be

more

definitive and less ambiguous as to what the Court meant by the
testimony going to the intent of the Defendant.
POINT NO. 5
DEFENSE COUNSEL FAILED TO REQUEST A MORE DEFINITIVE INSTRUCTION
ON THE ISSUE OF INTENT TO DISTRIBUTE.
The issue of distinction between the two Counts charged
against

KACSUTA,

POSSESSION

WITH

INTENT

TO

DISTRIBUTE

and

POSSESSION OF MARIJUANA, was the issue of intent to distribute.
The only instruction given at trial was the general definition of
intent.

There was no instruction regarding intent to distribute.

Defense Counsel should have requested that such an instruction be
given, particularly in light of the Court's ruling regarding the
admissibility of prior bad character testimony.

Without said

instruction, the cautionary instruction given by the Court becomes
misleading since the jury is not adequately instructed with regard
15

to the issue of intent to distribute, the general intent language,
which was given tends to be misleading as to what the Court meant
by its particular use of the terra*

The intent to possess is not

the same as the intent to distribute and this distinction should
have been more clearly defined and explained to the jury. Defense
Counsel did not offer such an instruction and none was given by the
Court.
POINT NO. 6
DEFENSE COUNSEL FAILED TO CALL WITNESSES OR INTRODUCE
EVIDENCE AS TO KACSUTA'S EMPLOYMENT.
Where the State of Utah had made it a critical issue of the
case that Mr. KACSUTA had Fifty-Eight ($58.00) Dollars on his
person and was believed to be unemployed.

Defense Counsel should

have called a witness or introduced evidence to verify KACSUTA's
employment.

Since KACSUTA did not testify at trial, the State's

unsubstantiated testimony went unrebutted.

Defense Counsel could

have called KACSUTA's employer or a work associate or KACSUTA
himself to testify of his employment circumstances at4 the time of
his arrest on March

17, 1994.

Although the jury was never

correctly informed as to KACSUTA's^employment circumstances, the
record seems to indicate that KACstJTA Was employed at the time of
his arrest.

See Trial Transcript at 47.
POINT NO. 7

DEFENSE COUNSEL FAILED TO C^LL AS WITNESSES THOSE PRESENT
IN KACSUTA'S APARTMENT AT THE TIME OF HIS ARREST.
As indicated above, KACSUTA1 did not testify at trial. Whether
this was a trial strategy known to counsel prior to trial is
16

unknown.

However, what seemed clear and apparent prior to trial

was that the State would attempt to establish KACSUTA's intent to
distribute by inferences of bad character, prior criminal activity,
characterization of items seized from KACSUTA's apartment, and the
surrounding circumstances of the arrest. It is likely that Defense
Counsel knew before hand the witnesses that the State intended to
call at trial since a request for discovery or bill of particulars
had been made on the State.

However, at the time of the arrest,

KACSUTA was with his brother and several friends, only one of which
was

called

to testify.

There

seems to be no

satisfactory

explanation as to why Defense Counsel did not call KACSUTA's
brother and those others present in KACSUTA's apartment at the time
of his arrest for the "sole purpose of rebutting those inferences
that the State was attempting to use to show intent to distribute.
The one witness that was called, CODY BEAUMONT, did in fact testify
that he did not know that KACSUTA had marijuana on his person at
the time of his arrest.

If the testimony of KACSUTA's brother and

the others present was consistent with the testimony of BEAUMONT,
it would have gone a long way to rebutting the inferences drawn by
the State regarding the key issue of intent to distribute.
POINT NO. 8
DEFENSE COUNSEL FAILED TO REQUEST THE LESSER INCLUDED INSTRUCTION
ON THE OFFENSE OF ATTEMPTED POSSESSION OF A CONTROLLED
SUBSTANCE WITH INTENT TO DISTRIBUTE.
Since there was little or no defense asserted in the case, the
State's case in chief went uncontroverted as far as the evidence
was concerned.

That evidence established that KACSUTA had three
17

baggies of marijuana and Fifty-Eight ($58.00) Dollars in cash on
his person; that he was unemployed at the time of his arrest; that
he had various items of drug paraphernalia in his apartment; that
he had on previous occasions smoked marijuana with others and on
one occasion sold a small quantity of marijuana to another; and,
that one or more of the individuals in KACSUTA's room on the night
of his arrest was under the age of eighteen years.

However, no

testimony or evidence was presented that on the evening of March
17, 1994, that marijuana was distributed or even known about by
others in KACSUTA's apartment.

There was no evidence of any

discussion regarding marijuana or the distribution thereof that
evening.
distribute

The evidence supporting the jury's finding of intent to
is

based

solely

upon

inferences

drawn

from

the

surrounding circumstances, uncorroborated by any testimony or
statement. The fact that KACSUTA was charged with POSSESSION OF A
CONTROLLED

SUBSTANCE

as well

as

POSSESSION

OF

A

CONTROLLED

SUBSTANCE WITH INTENT TO DISTRIBUTE, strongly suggests a defense in
having the lesser included offense of ATTEMPTED POSSESSION OF A
CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE WITH INTENT TO DISTRIBUTE, included as a
lesser included instruction for the jury's consideration. Defense
Counsel did not do so.

It is not clear in the record whether such

consideration was in fact decided upon &s part of Defense's trial
strategy.
B*.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO GRANT KACSUTA'S MOTION
TO SUPPRESS, IN PARTICULAR, WITH REGARD TO TESTIMONY OF
KACSUTArS BAD CHARACTER, WHERE SUCH WAS REMOTE, CONFUSED
THE ISSUES, MISLEAD THE JURY AND/OR WAS CUMULATIVE.
18

Rule 404(b), Utah Rule of Evidence addresses and provides
certain limitations on character evidence.

Therein it states:

(b) Other Crimes, Wrong or Acts, Evidence of
other crimes, wrongs or acts are not
admissible to prove the character of a person
in order to show that he acted in conformity
therewith. It may, however, be admissible for
other purposes, such as proof of motive,
opportunity,
intent,
preparation,
plan,
knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or
accident.
It has generally been the policy not to allow the State to
discredit the character of a Defendant where the Defendant does not
call character witnesses in his behalf as a defense.

In other

words, it is rarely the practice to allow the State to introduce as
part of their case in chief, bad character testimony.
Since in the instant case, KACSUTA did not testify and no
witnesses were called by Defense Counsel in KACSUTA's behalf,
neither KACSUTA's knowledge nor intent were at issue.

Compare

State v. Brown, 577 P.2 135 (Utah 1978), where evidence of alleged
prior unrelated offense involving similar criminal activity by
Defendant

was

properly

admitted

as

evidence

of

Defendant's

knowledge and intent, where Defendant had testified that he was
innocently involved in the criifiina^ .actions of his son and directly
put at issue his own knpwledge. ^nc| intent.

Compare also State v.

McLane, 706 P. 2 603 (Utah(19p5>, where the Utah Supreme Court found
that the trial court did not abuse it's discretion in permitting
evidence to be presented to the jury of nine returned checks which
were not at issue, such the admission of the checks was for the
purpose of attacking the credibility of both the Defendant and her
19

father as witnesses and to show knowledge, intent or absence of
mistake in a prosecution for issuing bad checks.
The Utah Supreme Court has upheld the use of a cautionary
instruction when such evidence is admitted.
700 p.2 1106 (Utah 1985).

See State v, Smith.

However, it has not been addressed in

what form the cautionary instruction should be given, whether
verbal or written, as with other jury instructions, or at what
stage in trial proceeding such instruction should be given, or the
extent and scope of such cautionary instruction. All of these are
at issue in the present case.
Similarly, the Utah Supreme Court has addressed the issue of
allowing specific instances of misconduct as evidence to prove a
character trait. In State v. Minnish, 560 P,2 340 (Utah 1977), the
Court found that evidence of conduct in specific instances is not
admissible to prove a character trait, except in the case of prior
criminal convictions.

Consequently, the introduction of evidence

regarding criminal activity for which KACSUTA had never been
charged, arrested or questioned, not only was inadmissible under
Minnish but completely changed the posturing of KACSUTA's defense.
KACSUTA was now faced with having to dispute allegations regarding
charges that were never brought against him. He was now forced to
encompass

in

his

defense

explanations

and

justification

for

activity remote from the activity for which he had been charged,
arrested and ultimately convicted.
simply

having

deliberations.

a

some
It

The problems went far beyond

prejudicial

effectively
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impact

robbed

the

upon

the

Defendant

jury's
of

his

constitutional rights of presumption of innocence, substantive due
process and equal protection*

The Defendant was literally forced

to defend himself against phantom charges and crimes and make that
a part of his defense strategy to defend against the two charges
filed against him.
Defense Counsel had moved to suppress the evidence. First, it
attempted to Suppress the evidence generated from the search and
arrest of the KACSUTA, this consisted of three baggies of marijuana
and Fifty-Eight ($58.00) Dollars in cash. Defense Counsel asserted
the probation officer had no reasonable suspicion at the time of
the search and therefore the search was illegal and/or improper.
Defense Counsel's motion clearly attempts to suppress the
testimony of SCOTT CLEMMONS and those other witnesses.

However,

the evidence was allowed to be admitted and the inference was draw
that KACSUTA intended to distribute on March 17, 1994, without
corroborating

evidence.

Defense

Counsel

objected

to

its

admissibility on the grounds set forth in Rule 404(b), Utah Rule of
Evidence, the Court allowed the testimony in under Rule 403.
Although
principal

the
of

trial

Court

took

into

whether, tl*e07|);robative

consideration
value

of

the

the basic
testimony

substantially outweighed the danger of prejudice, it seems to have
misapplied the rule with regard to whether the information would
confuse the issues, mislead the jury or constitute a needless
presentation of cumulative evidence.
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POINT NO. 1
BY ALLOWING THE TESTIMONY OF PRIOR CRIMINAL ACTIVITY, THE COURT
CREATED A BREEDING GROUND FOR CONFUSION OF THE ISSUE OF INTENT.
Through cautionary instruction, the Court informed the jury
that testimony of BEAUMONT, PEREZ and CLEMMONS, was only relevant
to issue of intent and should only be considered for that purpose.
However, there was no written cautionary instruction delivered to
the jury for deliberation. The instruction was given orally at the
time of BEAUMONT'S testimony

and was unqualified, ambiguous,

unclear and incomplete. There was no further instruction given as
to intent to distribute.

There was no admonition given that

KACSUTA was presumed innocent until proven guilty of any prior
criminal activity that came to light by reason of the testimony.
There was no explanation given to the jury as to which testimony or
evidence should come under the cautionary instruction.
POINT NO. 2
WITH THE INCOMPLETE AND INADEQUATE CAUTIONARY INSTRUCTION, THE
TESTIMONY AT TRIAL HAD A HIGH PROBABILITY OF MISLEADING THE JURY
TO BELIEVE THAT THE PRIOR CRIMINAL WAS RELATED TO THE EVENTS
OF KACSUTA'S ARREST BEYOND THE ISSUE OF INTENT.
By issuing the cautionary instruction, the Court was aware of
the high probability of prejudicing KACSUTA by allowing such
testimony.

However9 the fact that the instruction was given only

verbally and did not qualify itself as to which testimony it
applied to and the fact that it was given only before BEAUMONT'S
testimony and not during the testimony of either PEREZ or CLEMMONS,
there was a strong likelihood and high probability that the jury
had insufficient information upon which to correctly apply the
22

cautionary instruction.

In short, if the jury did not fully

understand and comprehend the scope and extent of the cautionary
instruction, they were misled.
POINT NO. 3
THE TESTIMONY REGARDING KACSUTA'S PRIOR ACTIVITIES WAS REMOTE.
HOWEVER, THERE WAS NO FURTHER INSTRUCTION GIVEN AS TO THE
WEIGHT AND SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE.
Generally, remoteness is a factor that goes to the weight of
the evidence and not to it's admissibility.

In this case, the

testimony was deemed admissible even though it was very remote.
However, the jury was not instructed as to how remoteness in
considering what weight and sufficiency they should give under the
circumstances of this incident.

If the jury was not instructed

that remote evidence should be given less weight than other
relevant evidence, then there is a substantial likelihood that the
jury would be confused or mislead by simply given such testimony
and cautioning them only to consider it for purposes of intent. By
issuing the cautionary instruction the Court instructed the jury to
giv& the testimony full consideration as evidence of intent.
POINT NO. 4
THE STATE OF UTAH HAD OTHER MEANS AT IT'S DISPOSAL FOR
ESTABLISHING INTENT AND THE EVIDENCE ALLOWED TO BE ADMITTED
BY THE COURT WAS IN FACT CUMULATIVE AND REFERRED TO
SPECIFIC CRIMINAL,ACTS.
It was clear to the Court that the testimony that was to be
presented by the State from BEAUMONT, PEREZ and CLEMMONS was
character testimony and referred to specific acts of criminal
activity for which KACSUTA had never been charged with or convicted
of.

In considering its probative value, the Court took the
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position that because there were three witnesses, instead of one,
that somehow made the evidence more probative.

However, the Rule

seems to make clear that if the evidence is cumulative then it
should not be admitted.

In other words, if the State of Utah, had

other means of establishing intent, which they had in this case,
then the evidence should not have been admitted.

The testimony of

PEREZ and CLEMMONS was absolutely unnecessary since neither person
was present with KACSUTA on the evening of his arrest and the
activities regarding which they testified were two to three weeks
prior to March 17, 1994. In addition, the Stat>e had other evidence
regarding the issue of intent.

That evidence of three baggies o£

marijuana found on the Defendant's person, the paraphernalia found
in KACSUTA's apartment and the witnesses which were present in
KACSUTA's apartment on the evening of his arrest.
had

expert

testimony

of

criminologist,

a drug

The State also
inspector, a

probation officer, and two investigating officers from Beaver City
Police Department. There was simply no need to allow4the testimony
regarding prior criminal acts for which KACSUTA was never charged,
arrested or convicted.
The Court inquired as to the State's ability to prove intent
by sources other than these witnesses and the State advised the
Court that they did have other means establishing such testimony.
However, the Court allowed the testimony and attempted to minimize
its

prejudicial

impact

by

issuing

instruction.
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an

inadequate

cautionary

c.
THERE HAS INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO CONVICT THE DEFENDANT ON
POSSESSION OF A CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE WITH INTENT TO DISTRIBUTE,
A SECOND DEGREE FELONY.
In the instant case, the evidence was insufficient to convict
on the charge of Possession of a Controlled Substance with Intent
to Distribute, because there was no reliable evidence given
regarding intent.

It was uncontroverted that CODY BEAUMONT, who

was the only person who was present the evening of Defendant's
arrest who testified at trial, was unaware that Defendant has
marijuana on his person that evening.

MATT MANDERA later told

investigating officers that he owned the scales which were found in
the Defendant's apartment. The three baggies found in Defendant's
possession were in very small quantities, consistent with personal
use.

The amounts were not evenly divided.

The prior activity

involving BEAUMONT, PEREZ and CLEMMONS, regarded criminal activity
for which the Defendant had never been charged or arrested and had
occurred two to three weeks prior to Defendant's arrest on March
17, 1994. The arresting officers had not reasonable suspicion to
search the Defendant.

The officers who conducted the search of

Defendant's apartment had no search warrant and the search was not
made incident to arrest.
D.
THE COURT ERRED IN NOT REDUCING JUDGMENT OF CONVICTION AT
THE TIME OP SENTENCING.
On July 19, 1994, KACSUTA was sentenced on a Second Degree
Felony, POSSESSION OF A CONTROLLED
DISTRIBUTE.

SUBSTANCE WITH

INTENT TO

There was no evidence of actual distribution.
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There

was no testimony that anyone was actually aware that KACSUTA had
marijuana on his person*

At least one person with KACSUTA that

evening was under the age o£ eighteen years. The critical item of
paraphernalia, the scales, appears to have been owned by somebody
else*
Because of the lack of evidence as to what took place on the
evening of March 17, 1994/ it seems clear that the jury drew the
inferences

argued

by the

State to

infer

criminal

intent to

distribute from the circumstances involving prior instances of
criminal activity, the jury did not consider a lesser included
charge of ATTEMPTED DISTRIBUTION OF A CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE, even
though the facts and circumstances seem to more appropriately fit
within that level of offense*

The Court essentially was given the

opportunity to consider a lesser included offense at the time of
sentencing and declined to do so by denying KACSUTA's Motion to
RedUde.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, Defendant/Appellant moves for
dismissal of the action or in the alternative remand for retrial,
together with such other and further relief as to this Court
appears equitable and proper•
DATED this

Cn 19 *f*

<7 ^ ( ^-day of

w^KSON

.

^

for Defendant/Appellant
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ADDENDUM
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John 0. Christiansen
Attorney for Defendant
P. 0. Box 1468
Beaver, Utah 84713
Tel. 801-438-5412
THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR BEAVER COUNTY, STATE OF UT
STATE OF UTAH,

)

MOTION FOR REDUCTION OF

Plaintiff,

)

JUDGMENT OF CONVICTION--

vs.

)

NOTICE OF HEARING--

)

CERYIFICATE OF SERVICE

)

No. 94-CR-36

JARED CHRISTOPHER KACSUTA,
Defendant

MOTION
Defendant, by and through her counsel of record, hereby mov
the court for an order reducing the judgment of conviction of
Defendant entered in the above-entitled action from a felony of
the second degree to a felony of the third degree pursuant to
the provisions of Utah Code Section 76-3-402.
This motion is based on the records and files in this actio
and upon whatever evidence and/or argument that may be presented
at the hearing and the evidence presented at the trial.
Dated July 19, 1994.

John 0. Christiansen
Attorney for Defendant

NOTICE OF HEARING
TO LEO G. KANELL, BEAVER COUNTY ATTORNEY, ATTORNEY FOR PLAINTIFF
Please take notice that Defendant will clal up the foregoin
MOTION FOR REDUCTION OF JUDGMENT OF CONVICTION for hearing and
disposition on the 19th day of July, 1994, at the hour of 10:00
o'clock A.M., or as soon thereafter as judgment is entered and
sentence pronounced, at the Courtroom in the Beaver County Court
105 East Center Street, Beaver City, Utah.

John 0. Christiansen
Attorney for Defendant
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I served the foregoing Motion and Not
on Plaintiff by delivering a copy thereof to Leo G. Kanell, Bea\
County Attorney, at his office in the Beaver County Courthouse,
on the 19th day of July, 1994.

John 0. Christiansen,
Attorney for Defendant

-2-

John 0. Christiansen
Attorney for Defendant
P. 0. Box 1468
Beaver, Utah 84713
Tel. 438-5412 or 438-$002

JUN L 71994
JL

THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR BEAVER COUNTY, STATE OF UTA
DEFENDANT'S MEMORANDUM IN

STATE OF UTAH,

SUPPORT OF MOTION TO SUPPRES

Plaintiff.
vs.
JARED CHRISTOPHER KACSUTA,

No. 94-CR-36

Defendant

Defendant hereby presents his memorandum in support of his
Motion to Suppress dated June<l4, 1994.

FACTS

Defendant assumes that the facts which will be developed at
the hearing on the Motion to Suppress will be substantially the s
as presented at the preliminary examination, and the legal analys
herein is based on that assumption.

LEGAL ARGUMENT

I.
This portion "I" of the analysis is directed to paragraph !f
of the Motion to Suppress, th&t is, suppressing of all evidence
generated from the arrest and search of Defendant on March 17, 1(
at or near Apartment 5 of the apartment building located at 25
West 100 North Street in Beaver City, Utah.

1.

Defendant was on parole from the Utah State Prison and \

being supervised by Agent Rod Seymour
Adult Probation and Parole.

of the Utah Department of

Defendant had executed a Parole

Agreement, copy attached marked MBxhibit A".

Defendant was oblij

to file a report with his supervising agent by not later than th<
10th day of each month, but he had not done so by March 17 for
that month.

Agents Seymour and Eckman went to Defendant's apart

ment above mentioned on the evening of March 17, 1994, to check
into the lack of reporting for that month.
the apartment by Defendant and Agent Seymour

They were admitted t
viewed the livingr

area and saw five or sig other persons therein playing games, bu
the agents did not notice any indication of the presence or use
marijuana or other illegal drugs.
2.

Agent Seymour

requested Defendant to step into the

hallway which Defendant did.

Then the agent proceeded to search

Defendant by patting and a shake down for the agent's stated rea
of self-protection and because Defendant had failed to file a
report.

The search located cash in an approximate amount of

$58.00 and three small plastic bags in the left front pocket of
Defendant's trousers.

The, agent felt on the outside that someth

was in the left front pocket and he then withdrew the bags.
weapons were found.

No

The agent carefully examined the bags and f

in each a small quantity of what he identified to be marijuana.
After that examination, Agent Seymour

placed defendant under

arrest for failure to report on his parole and for possession of
marijuana.

No statement of an intention, cause or authority to

made to Defendant until after the search was completed and the
supposed marijuana identified.
-7-

3.

The citizen's right to be free from unreasonable search*

and seizures is secured by the Amendment IV of the United States
Constitution and Article t, Section 14, of the Constitution of UJ
For a search to be lawful, the State must justify it by some
affirmative purposfe and manner that relax the constitutional
prohibitions.
4.

Paragraph "5" of the Parole Agreement granted author it

search Defendant upoh reasonaoie suspicion to insure compliance
with the conditions of the-parole.

The only violation of the pa

conditions of which the agent had any suspicion was the failure
to report, (and that might not have become to the level of "reas
able suspicion" since the teport was not long overdue), but ther
was no basis for a suspicion as to the possession or use of ille
drugs at thd time that the search was commenced.

It does not

appear that a search would be necessary or appropriate because o
a failure to report.

If a search for weapons was permissible,

a withdrawal of the three small flexible plastic bags from the
inside of defendant's Docket was not lustified as a feeling of t
through the trouser material on tne outside would not have given
a reasonable impression that there was a firearm, knife or other
weapon inside the pocket.

The search went beyond what was permi

and the search for and the seizure of the marijuana were illegal
and should be suppressed.
Even if an arrest for failure to report was justified, the
search cannot be justified &s being incident to an arrest.
(a)

Section 77-7-1,

Utah Code, states in pertinent part:

"An arrest is the actual restraint of the person arrested or
submission to custody." ...

There was neither restraint nor

submission to custody until the arrest was announced and after
the search and seizure were completed.

Prior to that time, Defen

was only acting on'the request of the agent.
(b)

Section 77-7-6, Utah Code, states in pertinent part:

"The person making'the arrest shall Inform the person being arres
of his intention, cAnse

and authority to arrest him." ... Again,

none of these requirements,was done .until after the search and th
seizure of

the mariluana were completed.

It is significant the

the officer stated the cause and basis for the arrest to be for
failure to report and for possession of marijuana, indicating th*
the illegal search formed h jJart

of the basis for the arrest.Foi

search to have been incident to the arrest, it would

had to hav<

been performed following the arrest or, at most, during the arrej
but it could not have been prior to the arrest*

II.
This portion

,f

IIff analyzes

paragraph

?f M

2

of the Motion to

Suppress, that is, that all evidence generated from the search oi
Defendant's apartment should be suppressed.

The sole and exclu1

basis for the search of the apartment was the report that Agent
Seymour

gave to the personnel at the County Jail that he had

seized supposed marijuana from the person of defendant at the
apartment and his 'Suggest ion It hat a search of the apartment be
conducted.

That rMort jwasi sin insufficient and illegal basis fo

the search for the) ioiiowih£ treasons:
1.

The search of Defendant and the seizure of the marijuan

from his person was illegal and all police action based thereon
was

f,

fruit from the poisonous tree" and was burdened with the
-A-

(See section "I11 of this memorandum.)
J
This rule is explained in the Utah Supreme Court case of State vs
same taint as that search.

Thurman, 846 P2d 1256, particularly section H 7 " commencing on Paj
1262, copy attached as "Exhibit Blf. As stated in Thurman, the re
for the rule is to deter future Improper police action*

Although

the subsequent consent search of the storage unit was sustained j
the Thurman case despite the illegal entry into and search of th(
apartment, the application of the rule would surely suppress the
search of the apartment under the facts in this Kacsuta case. Tl
were no intervening facts in this case to give additional supporl
to a basis for the apartment search.

It is significant that the

officers who went to the apartment to arrest Jason Kaesuta betwe<
the time of the arrest or aerenaant and the search of the apartm<
found no indication of1the presence of marijuana in the apartmem
To allow evidence gathered from a search of the apartment woul$
tend to lure police officers 'into a false security that the basi"
for the search is not important because the search will be
sustained regardless*

The'fact,that the search was with the

consent of Defendant doesjnot cure the defect under the Thurman
rule and similar authorities.
2.

The report of Agent Seymour

that he had seized marijuai

from the person of Defendant at! the apartment did not constitute
probable cause for the search of the apartment.

Had'the police

personnel submitted the facts,to a magistrate for a determinatio
of whether or not probable cause existed for the issuance of a
search warrant, the Question could have been judicially decided
and the present dispute cbuld have been avoided.

If the magistr

had ruled that there4was not probable'cause, perhaps further

investigation could have been made resulting in sufficient addit
supportive evidence being collected.

III.
This pottion of this memorandum analyzes paragraph "3" of t
Motion to Suppress, that is, suppressing evidence of

purchases

from Defendant of marijuana prior to March 17, 1994, the date of
the arrest.

At the preliminary examination, one Scott Clemons

testified that he had purchased a small quantity of tnarijuana fr
Defendant two or three weeks prior to March 17, 1994.
m e general ruie tnat. evidence or ox^ner crimes is noD
admissible in a criminal action is set forth in American Jurisprudence 2d, V. 294 Evidence Sec. 320, copy attached marked "Bxh
C".

The reason for the rule is that such evidence is prejudicia

against Defendant in that it may misdirect the attention of the
to a consideration!or tne otner crimes ratner tnan on tne crime
being tried, and thejury mayfreceive the impression that the
accused is an habitual criminal and should be punished whether o
not he is guilty of the icrlm^ being ttied.

There are exceptions

whether the evidence has sufficient Drobative value to iustifv t
prejudicial effect that it will have,|bearing in mind the defend
presumption of innocence.

In the instant case, the sale by Defe

of such a small quantity, two or three weeks before does not have
any significant probative value as evidence of Defendants inter
as to his intended disposition of the small auantltv that he hac
in his Docket at the time of the

search.

The time lanse betwec

the supposed sale to Clemons and the time of the search was too
-6-

lorfS ^
an(j
Qr

provide a carry over of intent from the time of th*

the time of the sekrch.

The weakness of the testimony

other similar witness, however, might not be accurately

by the jury and the result would be unduly prejudicial aga

For the foregoing reasons, Defendant's Motion to Supp
sh0uld

be granted In total, •

Dated June 17, 1994.

John 0. Christiansen,
Attorney for Defendant

CERTIFICATE OF, SERVICE

I delivered a copy of the foregoing Memorandum, with
meftts,

to Leo G. Kanell, Beaver County Attorney, Attorney

Stj^te, at his office in the Beaver Couljty Courthouse on th'
qf

June, 1994.

John 0. Christiansen,
Attorney for Defendant

-7-

'"i'«\ ] (:

John 0. Christiansen
Attorney for Defendant
P. 0. box 1468
Beaver, Utah 84 713
Tel. 438-5412
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THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT!COURT FOR BEAVER COUNTY, STATE
STATE OF UTAH,

Plaintiff,

MOTION TO SUPPRESS —

vs.

NOTICE OF HEARING-CERTIFICATE OF SERVIC

JARED KACSUTA,

No. 94-CR-36

Defendant.
MOTION

Defendant hexieby moves the court for an order of suppr
as follows:
1.

Suppressing the arrest and search of Defendant, an

evidence generated therfrom, in or near Apartment No. 5 in
apartment building located at 25 West 100 North Street in B
City, Utah, on or about March 17, 1994.
2.

Suppressing the search of the apartment mentioned

paragraph "1" hereof, and all evidence generated therefrom,
on or about March 17, 1994.
3.

Suppressing all evidence of any sale or other de]i

controlled substances by Defendant to Scott Clemons or any
person prior to March 17, 1994.
This Motion i?'based, on [the Constitution of the Unitec
and the Constitution of Utah,, upon any evidence to be press
at the hearing,and .Upon memorandum which it is anticipated
presented.

John 0. Christiansen,
Attorney for Defendant

NOTICE

TO LBO G. KANELL, BEAVER COUNTY ATTORNEY, ATTORNEY FOR PLAIN
Please take notice that Defendant will call up the fore
Motion for hearing and dipsosition before the above-named eo
the Courtroom in the Beaver County Courthouse at 105 East Ce
Street in Beaver City, Utah, on the 21st day of June, 1994,
hour of 10:00 o'clock A.M., or as soon thereafter as the mat
may be set.

John 0. Christiansen,
Attorney for Defendant

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that I served the foregoing Motion anc
on Plaintiff by hand delivering a copy thereof to its attori
Leo G. Kanell, Beaver County Attorney, at his office in the
County Courthouse on the 14th day of June, 1994,

John 0. Christiansen,
Attorney for Defendant

LEO G. KANELL
Beaver County Attorney
P. 0. Box 471
Beaver, Utah 84713
Telephone: (8 01) 438-2 351
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRIC
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BEAVER

STATE OF UTAH,

:

Plaintiff,

JUDGMENT, SENTENCE
AND COMMITMENT

:

vs.

:

JARED KACSUTA,

:

Criminal No. 94-CR-3

Defendant.

This matter

having

regularly

come on

for se

before the Honorable J. Philip Eves,* District Court Judg
19th

day

of July,

1994, and

the

Defendant

being pres

represented by his attorney, JOHN 0. CHRISTIANSEN, and P
being represented by LEO G. KANELL, Beaver County Attorney,
Defendant having been found guilty by jury verdict of the
of POSSESSION OF A CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE WITH INTENT TO DIS
a second degree felony, in violation of Section 58-37-8(1)
Utah Code Annotated, as amended, and Defendant's attorne
made statements to the Court regarding mitigation of sent
the Defendant having made a statement in his own behalf,
Court having reviewed the recommendations in a presentenc

prepared by Utah State Department of Corrections, and
being

t\

fully advised in the premises, now makes and ent

following Judgment, Sentence, and Commitment.

JUDGMENT
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED 1
Defendant, JARED KACSUTA, is guilty of the offense of POSSE
A CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE WITH INTENT TO DISTRIBUTE, a secon
felony, in violation of Section 58-37-8(1)(A)(iv) and 58-37
(ix) and (x), and 58-37-8(5)(c), Utah Code Annotated, as

SENTENCE
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED
Defendant, JARED KACSUTA, is hereby Sentenced to incarcer
the Utah State Prison on the charge of POSSESSION OF A CC
SUBSTANCE WITH INTENT TO DISTRIBUTE, a second degree felony
indeterminate term of not less than one (1) year nor m
fifteen (15) years.
No fine is imposed.
Further,

the court

recommends

that the Defei

screened and considered for drug treatment^while in prise
a condition of parol.
No restitution is ordered.
2

is ordered that the Defendant be delivered to the Utah Stat
for the execution of said Sentence.
DATED this j 2 r d a Y

o f Jul

Y> 1994.

J/ PHI LI]
district Court Judge
CERTIFICATE
STATE OF UTAH

)
: ss.
County of Beaver)
I, Paul B. Barton, clerk of said District court (
County, State of Utah, do hereby certify that the Hono
PHILIP EVES, whose name is subscribed to the preceding cei
is the Judge of said Court, duly commissioned and qualif
that the signature of said Judge to said certificate is c
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have ^hereunto

set my

affixed the seal of the Court tl£i^vI$!£^4ay. of July, 19ic

Approved as to Form
and Content:

\\ PAtJL: B. BART,ON
\\CVzrK:-ofiFl"tf-^hDistrict
DistrictCoi
Uci^rk'^o^-Mf-th

JOHN 0. CHRISTIANSEN
Attorney for Defendant

4

Defendant is hereby notified that he has thirty (
from and after July 19, 1994, to appeal this judgment and s
or any part thereof.

Such appeal shall be pursuant to the I

Criminal and Civil Procedure and the laws of the State of
DATED this

July, 1994.
BY THE COURT,

COMMITMENT
The person of said Defendant, JARED KACSUTA, is
committed to the custody of the Utah Division of Correct
the purpose of executing the foregoing Judgment and Sentenc

3
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(m) revoke, suspend, restrict, or place on probation
the license,
(IV) issue a public or pnvate reprimand to the
individual,
(v) issue a cease and desist order, and
(vi) impose a civil penalty of not more than $1,000
for each dispensed prescription regarding which the
required information is not submitted
(b) Civil penalties assessed under Subsection (a)(vi)
shall be deposited in the General Fund
(c) The procedure for determining a civil violation of
this subsection shall be in accordance with Section 58-1108, regarding adjudicative proceedings within the division
(13) An individual who has submitted information to the
database in accordance with this section may not be held
civilly liable for having submitted the information
(14) (a) All department and the division costs necessary to
establish and operate the database shall be funded by
appropriations from the General Fund
(b) Funding for this section shall be appropriated without the use of any resources within the Commerce Service
Fund
(15) All costs associated with recording and submitting
data as required m this section shall be assumed by the
submitting drag outlet
io$s
58-37-8. P r o h i b i t e d a c t s — P e n a l t i e s .
(1) Prohibited acts A — Penalties
(a) Except as authorized by this chapter, it is unlawful
for any person to knowingly and intentionally
(l) produce manufacture, or dispense or to possess
with intent to produce, manufacture or dispense, a
controlled or counterfeit substance
(n) distribute a controlled or counterfeit substance,
or to agree, consent, offer, or arrange to distribute a
controlled or counterfeit substance,
(in) possess a controlled substance in the course of
his business as a sales representative of a manufacturer or distributor of substances listed in Schedules
II through V except that he may possess such controlled substances when they are prescribed to him by
a licensed practitioner, or
(iv) possess a controlled or counterfeit substance
with intent to distribute
(b) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (l)(a)
with respect to
(I) a substance classified in Schedule I or II is
guilty of a second degree felony and upon a second or
subsequent conviction of Subsection (l)(a) is guilty of
a first degree felony,
(n) a substance classified in Schedule III or IV, or
marijuana, is guilty of a third degree felony, and upon
a second or subsequent conviction punishable under
this subsection is guilty of a second degree felony, or
(in) a substance classified in Schedule V is guilty of
a class A misdemeanor and upon a second or subse
quent conviction punishable under this subsection is
guilty of a third degree felony
(2) Prohibited acts B — Penalties
(a) It is unlawful
(l) for any person knowingly and intentionally to
possess or use a controlled substance, unless it was
obtained under a valid prescription or order, directly
from a practitioner vvhile acting in the course of his
professional practice, or as otherwise authorized by
this subsection,
(n) for any owner tenant, licensee, or person in
control of any building, room, tenement, vehicle, boat,
aircraft or other place knowingly and intentionally to
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permit them to be occupied by persons u n l a w f ^
possessing, using, or distributing controlled $ u /
stances in any of those locations,
(in) for any person knowingly and intentionally f.
be present where controlled substances are be m
used or possessed m violation of this chapter and th«
use or possession is open, obvious, apparent, and no t
concealed from those present, however, a person i^av
not be convicted under this subsection if the evide^i
shows t h a t he did not use the substance himself 0
advise, encourage, or assist anyone else to do so, $nv
incidence of prior unlawful use of controlled sub,
stances by the defendant may be admitted to rebut
this defense,
(iv) for any person knowingly and intentionally u
possess an altered or forged prescnption or written ]
order for a controlled substance,
(v) for a practitioner licensed under this chapter
knowingly and intentionally to prescribe, administer
or dispense a controlled substance to a juvem]e'
without first obtainmg the consent required in $4'
tion 78-14-5 of a parent, guardian, or person stantW
in loco parentis of the juvenile except in cases of ^
emergency, for purposes of this subsection, a juvenile
means a "child" as defined in Section 78-3a % ^
"emergency" means any physical condition requinn?
the administration of a controlled substance for inj
mediate relief of pam or suffering,
(vi) for a practitioner licensed under this chapter
knowingly and intentionally to prescnbe or adrainu.
ter dosages of a controlled substance in excess of!
medically recognized quantities necessary to treat
the ailment, malady or condition of the ultimate usef
or
j
(vn) for any person to prescnbe, administer crj
dispense any controlled substance to another perscc
knowing that the other person is using a false name,j
address, or other personal information for ;he p
pose of secunng the same
(b) Any person convicted of violating Subsectioflj
(2)(a)(i) with respect to
(0 marijuana, if the amount is 100 pounds orim
is guilty of a second degree felony,
(n) a substance classified in Schedule I or II,
marijuana, if the amount is more than 16 ounces,
less than 100 pounds, is guilty of a third dej
felony, or
(in) marijuana, if the marijuana is not in theft
of an extracted resin from any part of the plant,
the amount is more than one ounce but less thtf
ounces, is guilty of a class A misdemeanor
j
(c) Any person convicted of violating Sub«#*j
(2)(a)(i) while inside the exterior boundaries °f P^jl
occupied by any correctional facility as defined m ^ J
64 13-1 or any public jail or other place of confined
shall be sentenced to a penalty one degree great* V
provided in Subsection (2)(b)
(d) Upon a second or subsequent conviction oi
sion of any controlled substance by a person P1*
convicted under Subsection (2)(b), that person s 1
sentenced to a one degree greater penalty than P
in this subsection
v *•
(e) Any person who violates Subsection ^X a jvj
respect to all other controlled substances not tftf
Subsection (2)(b)(i), (n) or (in), including l e s S . ^
ounce of manjuana, is guilty of a class B rms
Upon a second conviction for possession of *
substance as provided in this subsection, the r
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miilty of a class A misdemeanor, and upon a third or
subsequent conviction he is guilty of a third degree felony.
* {{) Any person convicted of violating Subsections
(2)(a)(ii) through (2)(a)(vii) is:
(i) on a first conviction, guilty of a class B misdemeanor;
(ii) on a second conviction, guilty of a class A
misdemeanor; and
(iii) on a third or subsequent conviction, guilty of a
third degree felony.
(3) Prohibited a c t s C — P e n a l t i e s :

(a) It is unlawful for any person:
(i) who is subject to this chapter to distribute or
dispense a controlled substance in violation of this
chapter;
(ii) who is a licensee to manufacture, distribute, or
dispense a controlled substance to another licensee or
other authorized person not authorized by his license;
(iii) to omit, remove, alter, or obliterate a symbol
required by this chapter or by a rule issued under this
chapter;
(iv) to refuse or fail to make, keep, or furnish any
record, notification, order form, statement, invoice, or
information required under this chapter; or
(v) to refuse entry into any premises for inspection
as authorized by this chapter.
(b) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (3)(a)
shall be punished by a civil penalty of not more than
' $5,000. The proceedings are independent of, and not in
lieu of, criminal proceedings under this chapter or any
other law of this state. If the violation is prosecuted by
information or indictment which alleges the violation was
committed knowingly or intentionally, that person is upon
conviction guiltv of a third degree felony
(4) Prohibited act* D — P e n a l t i e s :
(a) It is u n l a w f u l for a n y p e r s o n k n o w i n g l y a n d i n t e n tionally:

(i) to use in the course of the manufacture or
distribution of a controlled substance a license number which is fictitious, revoked, suspended, or issued
to another person or, for the purpose of obtaining a
controlled substance, to assume the title of, or represent himself to be, a manufacturer, wholesaler, apothecary, physician, dentist, veterinarian, or other authorized person;
(ii) to acquire or obtain possession of, to procure or
attempt to procure the administration of, to obtain a
prescription for, to prescribe or dispense to any person known to be attempting to acquire or obtain
possession of, or to procure the administration of any
controlled substance by misrepresentation or failure
by the person to disclose his receiving any controlled
substance from another source, fraud, forgery, deception, subterfuge, alteration of a prescription or written order for a controlled substance, or the use of a
false name or address;
dii) to make any false or forged prescription or
w
n t t e n order for a controlled substance, or to utter
the same, or to alter any prescription or written order
^sued or written under the terms of this chapter;
(iv) to furnish false or fraudulent material information in any application, report, or other document
re
quired to be kept by this chapter or to willfully
m&
ke any false statement in any prescription, order,
^port, or record required by this chapter; or
(v) to make, distribute, or possess any punch, die,
Plate, stone, or other thing designed to print, imprint,
r
? reproduce the trademark, trade name, or other
1(
tentifying mark, imprint, or device of another or any

58-37-8

likeness of any of the foregoing upon any drug or
container or labeling so as to render any drug a
counterfeit controlled substance.
(b) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (4)(a)
is guilty of a third degree felony.
(5) Prohibited acts E — Penalties:
(a) Notwithstanding other provisions of this section, a
person not authorized under this chapter who commits
any act declared to be unlawful under this section, Title
58, Chapter 37a, Utah Drug Paraphernalia Act, or under
Title 58, Chapter 37b, Imitation Controlled Substances
Act, is upon conviction subject to the penalties and
classifications under Subsection (5)(b) if the act is committed:
(i) in a public or private elementary or secondary
school or on the grounds of any of those schools;
(ii) in a public or private vocational school or
post-secondary institution or on the grounds of any of
those schools or institutions;
(iii) in those portions of any building, park, stadium, or other structure or grounds which are, at the
time of the act, being used for an activity sponsored
by or through a school or institution under Subsections (5)(a)(i) and (ii);
(iv) in or on the grounds of a preschool or child-care
facility;
(v) in a public park, amusement park, arcade, or
recreation center;
(vi) in a church or synagogue;
(vii) in a shopping mall, sports facility, stadium,
arena, theater, movie house, playhouse, or parking lot
or structure adjacent thereto;
(viii) in a public parking lot or structure;
(ix) within 1,000 feet of any structure, facility, or
grounds included in Subsections (5)(aj(u through
(viii); or
(x) with a person younger than 18 years of age,
regardless of where the act occurs.
(b) A person convicted under this subsection is guilty of
a first degree felony and shall be imprisoned for a term of
not less than five years if the penalty that would otherwise have been established but for this subsection would
have been a first degree felony. Imposition or execution of
the sentence may not be suspended, and the person is not
eligible for parole until the minimum te*rm of imprisonment under this subsection has been served.
(c) If the classification that would otherwise have been
established would have been less than a first degree
felony but for this subsection, a person convicted under
this subsection is guilty of one degree more than the
maximum penalty prescribed for that offense.
1
(d) It is not a defense to a prosecution under this
subsection that the actor mistakenly believed the individual to be 18 years of age or older at the time of the offense
or was unaware of the individual's true age; nor that the
actor mistakenly believed that the location where the act
occurred was not as described in Subsection (5)(a) or was
unaware t h a t the location where the act occurred was as
described in Subsection (5)(a).
(6) Any violation of this chapter for which no penalty is
specified is a class B misdemeanor.
(7) Any person who attempts or conspires to commit any
offense unlawful under this chapter is upon conviction guilty
of one degree less than the maximum penalty prescribed for
that offense.
(8) (a) Any penalty imposed for violation of this section is
in addition to, and not in lieu of, any civil or administrative penalty or sanction authorized by law.
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(b) Where violation of this chapter violates a federal
law or the law of another state, conviction or acquittal
under federal law or the law of another state for the same
act is a bar to prosecution in this state.
(9) (a) When it appeurs to the court at the time of sentencing any person convicted under this chapter that the
person has previously been convicted of an offense under
the laws of this state, the United States, or another state,
which if committed in this state would be an offense
within this chapter and it appears that probation would
not be of benefit to the defendant or that probation would
be contrary to the interest, welfare, or protection of
society, the court, notwithstanding Section 77-18-1, may if"
there is compliance with Subsection (9)(b), impose a
minimum term to be served by the defendant, of up to Vfe
the maximum sentence imposed by law for the offense
, committed For violations of this section, this subsection
supersedes Section 77-18-4.
(b) (i) Before any person may be sentenced to a minimum term as provided in Subsection (9)(a), the prosecuting attorney, or grand jury if an indictment, shall
cause to be subscribed upon the complaint, in misdemeanor cases, or the information or indictment, in
addition to the substantive offense charged, a statement writing forth the alleged past conviction of the
defendant and specifically stating the date and place
of conviction and the offense of which the defendant
was convicted. The allegation shall be presented to
the defendant at the time of his arraignment, or
afterwards by leave of court, but in no event later
than two days prior to the trial of the offense charged
or the defendant's entering a plea of guilty. At the
time of arraignment or a later date when granted by
the court, the court shall read the allegation of the
prr-\ 1 >u.s conviction to the defendant, provide him or
}, .- . nmsel with a copy >r '?, and explain to the
deiondant the consequence of the allegation und< Subsection (9Xa). The allegation of the past conviction of the defendant is not admissible in a jury trial,
except where the admissibility in evidence of a previous conviction is otherwise recognized as admissible by law.
(ii) The court, following conviction of the defendant
of the substantive offense charged and prior to imposing sentence, shall inform the defendant of its decision to impose a minimum sentence under Subsection
(9Xaj and inquire as to whether the defendant admits
or denies the previous conviction. If the defendant
denies the previous conviction, the court shall afford
him an opportunity to present evidence showing that
the allegation of the past conviction is erroneous or
the conviction was lawfully vacated or the defendant
was pardoned. The evidence shall be made a matter
of record. Following the evidence, the court shall
make a finding as to whether the defendant has a
previous conviction, which finding is final, except for
a showing of abuse of discretion. Following the findings by the court, the defendant shall be sentenced
under Subsection (9)(a) or under the appropriate
penalty provided by law, as the court in its discretion
determines.
(c) Any person sentenced on a second offense to probation who violates that probation is subject to Subsections
(9)(a) and < 9;(b).
(d) For violations of this section, Subsection (9) supersedes Section 76-3-203.5.
(10) In any prosecution for a violation of this chapter,
evidence or proof which shows a person or persons produced,
manufactured, possessed, distributed, or dispensed a con-
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trolled substance or substances, is prima facie evidence a
the person or persons did so with knowledge of the charact*
of the substance or substances.
(11) This section does not prohibit a veterinarian, in ^
faith and in the course of his professional practice only and not
for humans, from prescribing, dispensing, or administerin
controlled substances or from causing the substances to k!
administered by an assistant or orderly under his directio
and supervision.
(12) Civil or criminal liability may not be imposed un(}e
this section on:
(a) any person registered under the Controlled Sub.
stances Act who manufactures, distributes, or •
an imitation controlled substance for use as a placebo or
investigational new drug by a registered practitioner in
the ordinary course of professional practice or researcher
(b) any law enforcement officer acting in the course and
legitimate scope of his employment.
(13) If any provision of this chapter, or the application of
any provision to any person or circumstances, is held invalid
the remainder of this chapter shall be given effect without the
invalid provision or application.
JWJ
58-37-9. Investigators — S t a t u s of p e a c e officers.
Investigators for the Department of Commerce shall, for the
purpose of enforcing the provisions of this chapter, have the
status of peace officers.
w%
58-37-10.

S e a r c h w a r r a n t s — A d m i n i s t r a t i v e inspect i o n w a r r a n t s — I n s p e c t i o n s a n d seizures of
property without warrant.
(1) Search warrants relating to offenses involving controlled substances may be authorized in the same manners
provided in Title 77, Chapter 23.
(2) Issuance and execution of administrative inspection
warrants shall be as follows:
(a) Any judpe or magistrate of this state within his
jurisdiction up m proper oath or afh*-nation showing
probable cause, may issue warrants for the purpose of
conducting administrative inspections authorized by this
act or regulations thereunder and seizures of property
appropriate to such inspections. Probable cause for purposes of this act exists upon showing a valid public
interest in the effective enforcement of the act or rulei
promulgated thereunder sufficient to justify administrative inspection ofche area, premises, building, or conveyance in the circumstances specified in the application for
the warrant.
(b) A warrant shall issue only upon an affidavit of an
officer or employee duly designated and having knowledge
of the facts alleged sworn to before a judge or magistrate
which establish the grounds for issuing the warrant. If |
the judge or magistrate is satisfied that grounds for the
application exist or that there is probable cause to believe
they exist, he shall issue a warrant identifying the area,
premises, building, or conveyance to be inspected, the
purpose of the inspection, and if appropriate, the type<»
property to be inspected, if any. The warrant shall:
(i) state the grounds for its issuance and the name
of each person whose affidavit has been taken W
support it;
(ii) be directed to a person authorized by SectiC
58-37-9 of this act to execute it;
(iii) command the person to whom it is directed'
inspect the area, premises, building, or conveys0'
identified for the purpose specified and if appropn8*
direct the seizure of the property specified;
(iv) identify the item or types of property t°
seized, if any;

Rule 104

UTAH RULfis OF EVIDENCE

to the court by offer or was apparent from the context
within which questions were asked
(b) R e c o r d of offer a n d r u l i n g . The court may add a n y
other or further statement which shows the character of the
evidence, tne form in wnicri it was orferecr', trie objection m a ^ e
and the ruling thereon It may direct the making of an offer m '
question and answer form
(c) H e a r i n g of j u r y . In jury cases, proceedings shall ^ e
cor ducted, to the extent practicable, so as to prevent inadm,is_
sible evidence from being suggested to the jury by any m e a r ^
such as making statements or offers of proof or asking q u ^ s .
tions in the hearing of the jury
(d) P l a i n e r r o r . Nothing in this rule precludes taking
notice of plain errors affecting substantial rights although
they were not brought to the attention of the court
R u l e 104. P r e l i m i n a r y q u e s t i o n s .
(a) Q u e s t i o n s of a d m i s s i b i l i t y g e n e r a l l y . P r e l i m i n ^
questions concerning the qualification of a person to b$ a
witness, the existence of a privilege, or the admissibility 0 f
evidence shall be determined by the court, subject to the
provisions of Subdivision (b) In making its determination it 1S
not bound by the rules of evidence except those with respect ^0
privileges
(b) R e l e v a n c y c o n d i t i o n e d o n fact. When the r e l e v a r w
of evidence depends upon the fulfillment of a condition of fa^t
the court shall admit it upon, or subject to, the introduction 0 f
evidence sufficient to support a finding of the fulfillment of t ^ e
condition
(c) H e a r i n g of j u r y . Hearings on the admissibility 0 f
confessions shall in aff cases be conducted out of the hearing Df
the jury Hearings on other preliminary matters shall be ^ 0
conducted when the interests of justice require, or when ^ n
accused is a witness and so requests
(d) T e s t i m o n y by a c c u s e d . The accused does not, ^ v
testifying upon a preliminary matter become subject to croa s
examiij 1 iun as to other issues v \ je case
(e) Weight a n d c r e d i b i l i t y . This rule does not limit l ^ e
right of 8 party to introduce before the jury evidence releva^ t
to weight or credibility
(Amended effective October 1, 1992 )
R u l e 105. L i m i t e d a d m i s s i b i l i t y .
When evidence which is admissible as to one party or for oi^e
purpose but not admissible as to another party or for anoth^ r
purpose is admitted, the court, upon request, shall restrict t ^ e
evidence to its proper scope and instruct the jury accordingly
R u l e 106. R e m a i n d e r of o r r e l a t e d w r i t i n g s o r r^_
corded statements.
When a writing or recorded statement or part thereof l g
introduced by a party, an adverse party may require tl^ e
introduction at that time of any other part or any oth^ r
writing or recorded statement which ought in fairness to ^ e
considered contemporaneously with it
(Amended effective October 1, 1992 )
A R T I C L E II. J U D I C I A L N O T I C E .
R u l e 201. J u d i c i a l n o t i c e of a d j u d i c a t i v e facts.
(a) S c o p e of r u l e . This rule governs only judicial notice c,f
adjudicative facts
(b) K i n d s of facts. Ajudicially noticed fact must be one nc^
subject to reasonable dispute in that it is either (1) generally
known within the territorial jurisdiction of the trial court o r
(2) capable of accurate and ready determination by resort t 0
sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be Questioned
(c) W h e n d i s c r e t i o n a r y , A court may take judicial notice*
whether requested or not

(d) W h e n m a n d a t o r y . A court shall take judicial noti
requested by a party and supplied with the necessary , ? ^
mf 0K
mation
(e) O p p o r t u n i t y to be h e a r d , A party is entitled
timels request to an opportunity to be heard as to \vl
propriety of taking judicial notice and the tenor of the man
noticed In the absence of prior notification, the requests
be made after judicial notice has been taken
^
(f) T i m e of t a k i n g n o t i c e . Judicial notice may be taU n
any stage of the proceeding
"
(g) I n s t r u c t i n g jury. In a civil action or proceeding n*
court shall instruct the jury to accept as conclusive anyf*
judicially noticed In a criminal case, the court shall instnw
the jury that it may, but is not required to, accept as conclusive
any fact judicially noticed
^
ARTICLE III. P R E S U M P T I O N S .
R u l e 301. P r e s u m p t i o n s in g e n e r a l in civil actions and
proceedings.
(a) Effect. In all ci\ ll actions and proceedings not otherwitg
provided for by statute oi b> these rules, a presumption
imposes on the party agamst whom it is directed the burden of
proving that the nonexistence of the presumed fact is mow
probable than its existence
(b) I n c o n s i s t e n t p r e s u m p t i o n s . If presumptions are inconsistpnt, the presumption applies that is founded upon
weightier considerations of policy If considerations of policy
are of equal weight neither presumption applies
Ru]e 302, A p p l i c a b i l i t y of f e d e r a l Jaw in civil actioBi
and proceedings.
In civil actions and proceedings, the effect of a presumption
respecting a fact which is an element of a claim or defense tl
to which federal law supplies the rule of decision is determined in accordance with federal law
ARTICLE IV. RELEVANCY
AND ITS L I M I T S .
R u l e 401. Definition of " r e l e v a n t e v i d e n c e . "
"Relevant evidence" means evidence having any tendency to
make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to tht
determination of the action more probable or less probabb
than it would be without the evidence.
R u l e 402. R e l e v a n t e v i d e n c e g e n e r a l l y admissible; bS
relevant evidence inadmissible.
All relevant evidence is admissible, except as otherwW
provided by the Constitution of the United States or thl
Constitution of the state of Utah, statute, or by these rulei,*
b> othei rules applicable in courts of this state EvideflOl
v\hich is not relevant is not admissible
R u l e 403. E x c l u s i o n of r e l e v a n t e v i d e n c e on ground*«
p r e j u d i c e , confusion, o r w a s t e of time.
..
Although rele\ ant, evidence may be excluded if its probaUTi
value is substantially outweighed by the danger of una*
prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading ^ e - l U I ^ ? i ^
considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or nee<*
presentation of mmu'ative evidence
R u l e 404. C h a r a c t e r e v i d e n c e n o t admissible to p*"^
c o n d u c t ; e x c e p t i o n s ; o t h e r crimes.
^
(a) C h a r a c t e r e v i d e n c e g e n e r a l l y . Evidence of a Pf ^
character or a trait of character is not admission
purpose of proving action in conformity therewith on
ticular occasion, except
rtio^
(1) C h a r a c t e r of a c c u s e d . Evidence of a Pf ^ .
trait o( character offered by an accused, or by *»
ecution to rebut the same,
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(2) C h a r a c t e r of v i c t i m . E\ idence of a pertinent trait
of thniacter of the victim of the cnme offered by an
accused, or by the prosecution to rebut the same, or
evidence of a character trait of peacefulness of the victim
offered by the prosecution in a homicide case to rebut
evidence that the victim was the first aggressor,
(3) Character of w i t n e s s . Evidence of the character
of a witness, as provided in Rules 607, 608, and 609
(b) Other crimes, w r o n g s , or a c t s . Evidence of other
:rimes, wrongs or acts is not admissible to prove the character
jf a person in order to show action in conformity therewith It
may, however, be admissible for other purposes, such as proof
of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge,
identity, or absence of mistake or accident
(Amended effective October 1 1992 )
Rule 405. M e t h o d s of proving character.
(a) R e p u t a t i o n or opinion. In all cases in which evidence
of character or a trait of character of a person is admissible,
proof may be made by testimony as to reputation or by
testimony in the form of an opinion On cross examination,
inquir> is allowable into relevant specific instances of conduct
(b) Specific i n s t a n c e s of c o n d u c t . In cases in which
character or a trait of character of a person is essential
element of a charge, claim, or defense, proof may also be made
of specific instances of that persons conduct
(Amended effective October 1, 1992 j
Rule 406. Habit; routine practice.
Evidence of the habit of a person or of the routine practice of
an organization, whether corroborated or not and regardless
of the presence of eyewitnesses is relevant to prove that the
conduct ci rl person or organization on a particular occasion
was in conformity with the habit oi routine practice
Rule 407. S u b s e q u e n t remedial m e a s u r e s .
When, after an event, measures are taken which, if taken
previously, would have made the event less likely to occur,
evidence of the subsequent measures is not admissible to
prove negligence or culpable conduct in connection with the
event This rule does not require the exclusion of evidence of
subsequent measures when offered for another purpose, such
as proving ownership, contiol, or feasibility of precautionary
measures, if controverted, or impeachment
Rule 408. C o m p r o m i s e and offers to c o m p r o m i s e .
Evidence of (1) furnishing or offering or promising to furnish, or (2) accepting or offering or promising to accept, a
valuable consideration in compromising or attempting to
compromise a claim which was disputed as to either validity or
&
niount, is not admissible to prove liability for or invalidity of
the claim or its amount Evidence of conduct or statements
m
ade in compromise negotiations is likewise not admissible
fnis mle does not require the exclusion of any evidence
otherwise discoverable merely because it is presented in the
tourse of compromise negotiations This rule also does not
^ u i r e exclusion when the evidence is offered for another
Purpose, such as proving bias or prejudice of a witness,
^gativing a contention of undue delay, or proving an effort to
^struct a criminal investigation or prosecution
^ e 409. P a y m e n t of medical and similar e x p e n s e s .
Evidence of furnishing or offering or promising to pay
^e<hcal, hospital, or similar expenses occasioned by an injury
n
ot admissible to prove liability for the injury
u

ta 410. Inadmissibility of pleas, plea d i s c u s s i o n s ,
and related statements.
*,, c e Pt as otherwise provided in this rule, evidence of the
•owing ib not in nn> ci\ ll or criminal proceeding, admissible

Rule 412

against the defendant who made the plea or was a participant
in the plea discussions
(1) a plea of guilty which was later withdrawn,
(2) a plea of nolo contendere,
(3) any statement made in the course of anv proceedings under Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure or comparable state procedure regarding either
of the foregoing pleas, or
(4) any statement made in the course of plea discus
sions with an attorney for the prosecuting authontv
which do not result in a plea of guilty or which result in a
plea of guilty later withdrawn
However, such a statement is admissible d) in any proceeding
wherein another statement made in the course of the same
plea or plea discussions has been introduced and the statement ought in fairness be considered contemporaneously with
it, or (n) in a criminal proceeding for perjury or false statement
if the statement was made by the defendant under oath, on the
record and in the presence of counsel
Rule 411. Liability insurance.
Evidence that a person was or was not insured against
liability is not admissible upon the issue whether the person
acted negligently or otherwise wrongfully This rule does not
require the exclusion of evidence of insurance against liability
when offered for another purpose, such as proof of agency,
ownership, or control, or bias or prejudice of a witness
(Amended effective October 1, 1992 )
Rule 412. Admissibility of alleged victim's sexual behavior or alleged sexual predisposition.
(a) E v i d e n c e generally inadmissible. The following evi
dence is not admissible in any criminal proceeding involving
alleged sexual misconduct except as provided in paragraphs
(b) and (c)
(1) evidence offered to prove that any alleged victim
engaged in other sexual behavior, and
(2) evidence offered to prove any alleged victim's sexual
predisposition
(b) E x c e p t i o n s . The following evidence is admissible, if
otherwise admissible under these rules
(1) evidence of specific instances of sexual behavior b>
the alleged victim offered to prove -that a person other
than the accused was the source of the semen, injury, or
other physical evidence,
(2) evidence of specific instances of sexual behavior by
the alleged victim with respect to the person accused of
the sexual misconduct offered
(A) by the accused to prove consent, or
(B) by the prosecution, and
(3) evidence the exclusion of which would violate the
constitutional rights of the defendant
(c) P r o c e d u r e to d e t e r m i n e admissibility.
(1) A party intending to offer evidence under paragraph
(b) must
(A) file a written motion at least 14 days before
trial specifically describing the evidence and stating
the purpose for which it is offered unless the court, for
good cause, requires a different time for filing or
permits filing during trial, and
(B) serve the motion on all parties The prosecutor
shall timely notify the alleged victim or, when appropriate, the alleged victim's guardian or representative
(2) Before admitting evidence under this rule, the court
must conduct a h e a n n g in camera and afford the alleged
victim and parties a right to attend and be heard The
motion, related papers, and the record of the hearing
must be sealed and remain under seal unless the court
orders otherwise
(Added effective July 1, 1994 )
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AKTICIJ5 VII. OPINIONS AND EXPERT TESTIMONY.
gale 701. Opinion testimony b\ hi} w i t n e s s e s .
If the witness is not testifying as an expert, the witness
umon} in the form of opinions or inferences is limited to
. qe opinions or infeiences which are (a* rationally based on
, perception of the witness and (bj helpful to a clear
cJerstanding of the witness testimonv or the determination
.fafactin issue
(Amended effective October 1, 1992 )
Rule 702. Testimony by experts.
If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will
assist the trier ot fact to understand the evidence or to
determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by
jmowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify thereto m the form of an opinion or otherwise
Rule 703. Bases of opinion testimony by experts.
The facts or data in the particular case upon which an
expert bases an opinion or inference may be those perceived by
or made known to the expert at or before the hearing If of a
type reasonably relied upon by experts in the particular field
in forming opinions or inferences upon the subject, the facts or
data need not be admissible in evidence
(Amended effective October 1, 1992 )
Rule 704. Opinion on ultimate issue.
(a) Except as provided in subparagraph (b), testimony in
the form of an opinion or inference otherwise admissible is not
objectionable because it embraces an ultimate issue to be
decided b\ the tnei of fact
(b) No expert witness testifying with respect to the mental
state or condition of a defendant in a criminal case may state
an opinion or i- r< - nee as to whether the <i» fendant did or did
not have the n i n state or condition c i mating an element
of the crime changed or of a defense thf icto Such ultimate
issues are matters for the trier of fact alone
(Amended effective October 1, 1992 )
Rule 705. Disclosure of facts or data u n d e r l y i n g expert
opinion.
The expert ma\ testify in terms of opinion or inference and
[pve reasons therefor without prior disclosure of the underlying facts or data, unless the court requires otherwise The
expert may in am event be required to disclose the underlying
facts or data on cross examination
Amended effective October 1, 1992 )
Rule 706. Court-appointed experts.
(a) Appointment. I h e court may on its own motion or on
he motion of an> party enter an order to show cause why
l
xpert witness s should not be appointed, and may request
he parties to submit nominations The court may appoint an>
'Xpert witnesses agreed upon by the parties and may appoint
>x
pert witnesses of its own selection An expert witness shall
1Q
t be appointed by the court unless the witness consents to
| c t A witness so appointed shall be informed of the witness'
•uties by the court in writing, a copy of which shall be filed
s
ith the clerk, or at a conference in which the parties shall
lav
e opportunity to participate A witness so appointed shall
'dvise the parties of the witness'findings, if any, the witness'
'^position may be taken by any party, and the witness may be
a
'ied to testify by the court or any party The witness shall be
u
bject to cross examination by each party, including a party
a
^ n g the witness
(o) Compensation. Expert witnesses so appointed aie
n
titled to reasonable compensation in whatever sum the
°urt may allov The compensation thus fixed is payable from
mds which ma> be provided by law in criminal cases and civil
etions and proceedings involving just oompesahon under the

Rule 803

Fifth Amendment In other civil actions and proceedings the
compesation shall be paid b> the parties in such proportion
,3nd at such tune as the court direct, and thereafter charged in
like manner as other costs
(c) Disclosure of appointment. In the exercise of its
discretion, the court mav authorize disclosure to the jury of
the fact that the court appointed the expert witness
(d) Parties' experts of own selection. Nothing in this
rule limits the parties in calling expert witnesses of their own
selection
(Amended effective October 1 1992 )
ARTICLE VIII. HEARSAY.
Rule 801. Definitions.
The following definitions apply under this article
(a) Statement. A 'statement" is (1) an oral or written
assertion or (2) nonverbal conduct of a person, if it is
intended by the person as an assertion
(b) Declarant. A declarant' is a person who makes a
statement
(c) Hearsay. ' H e a r s a v ' is a statement, other than one
made b} the declarant while testifying at the trial or
hearing offered in evidence to prove the truth of the
matter asserted
(d) S t a t e m e n t s w hich are not hearsay. A statement
is not hearsay if
0 ) Prior statement
by witness. The declarant
testifies at the tual or bearing and is subject to
cross examination concprnmg the statement and the
statement i« (A) inconsistent with the declarant's
testimony or the witness denies having made the
statement or h »*> forgotten, or (B) consistent with the
declarant's t c ^ r »v and is offered to rebut an
express or unpin i charge against the declarant of
recent fabrics tion or improper influence or motive, or
(C) one of identification of a person made after
perceiving the person, or
{2} Admission by party-opponert. The statement is offered against a party and is (A) the party's
own statement, in eithe r an individual or a representative capacitv or B) a statement of which the party
has manifested an adoption or Relief in its truth, or
(C) a statement bv a person authorized by the party
to make a statement concerning the subject or (D) a
statement by the party s agent or servant concerning
a matter within the scope of the agency or employment, made during the existence of the relationship,
or (E) a statement by a coconspirator of a party
during the course and in furtherance of the conspiracy
(Amended effective October 1, 1992 )
Rule 802. Hearsay rule.
Hearsay is not admissible except as provided by law or by
these ruleb
Rule 803. H e a r s a y exceptions; availability of declarant
immaterial.
The following are not excluded by the hearsay rule, even
though the declarant is available as a witness
(1) P r e s e n t s e n s e impression. A statement describing or explaining an event or condition made while the
declarant was perceiving the event or condition or immediately thereafter
(2) Excited utterance. A statement relating to a
startling event or condition made while the declarant was
under the stress of excitement caused by the event or
condition

Rule 610
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(2) evidence that any witness has been convicted of a
crime shall be admitted if it involved dishonesty or false
statement, regardless of the punishment
(b) T i m e limit. Evidence of a conviction under this rule is
not admissible if a penod of more than ten years has elapsed
since the date of the conviction or of the release of the witness
from the confinement imposed for that conviction, whichever
is the later date, unless the court determines, in the interests
of justice, that the probative value of the conviction supported
by specific facts and circumstances substantially outweighs its
prejudicial effect However, evidence of a conviction more than
ten years old as calculated herein, is not admissible unless'the
proponent gives to the adverse party sufficient ad\ance writ
ten notice of intent to use such evidence to provide the adverse
party with a fair opportunity to contest the use of such
evidence
(c) Effect of p a r d o n , a n n u l m e n t , o r c e r t i f i c a t e of r e h a b i l i t a t i o n . Evidence of a conviction is not admissible under
this rule if (1) the conviction has been the subject of a pardon,
annulment, certificate of rehabilitation, or other equivalent
procedure based on a finding of the rehabilitation of the person
convicted, and that person has not been convicted of a subse
quent cnme which was punishable by death or imprisonment
in excess of one year, or (2) the conviction has been the subject
of a pardon, annulment, or other equivalent procedure based
on a finding of innocence
(d) J u v e n i l e a d j u d i c a t i o n s . Evidence of juvenile adjudications is generally not admissible under this rule The court
may, however, in a criminal case allow evidence of a juvenile
adjudication of a witness other than the accused if conviction
of the offense would be admissible to attack the credibility of
an adult and the court is satisfied that admission in evidence
is necessary for a fair determination of the issue of guilt or
innocence
(e) P e n d e n c y of a p p e a l . The pendency of an appeal there
from does not renuti evidence of a conviction inadmissible
Evidence of the pendency of an appeal is admissible
(Amended effective October 1, 1992 )
R u l e 610. R e l i g i o u s beliefs o r o p i n i o n s .
Evidence of the beliefs or opinions of a witness on matters of
religion is not admissible for the purpose of showing that by
reason of their nature the witness' credibility is impaired or
enhanced
(Amended effective October 1, 1992 )
R u l e 611. M o d e a n d o r d e r of I n t e r r o g a t i o n a n d p r e s e n tation.
(a) C o n t r o l by c o u r t The court shall exercise reasonable
control over the mode and order of interrogating witnesses
and presenting evidence so as to (1) make the interrogation
and presentation effective for the ascertainment of the truth
(2) avoid needless consumption of time, and (3) protect wit
nesses from harassment or undue embarrassment
(b) S c o p e of c r o s s - e x a i h i n a t i o n . Cross examination
should be limited to the subject matter of the direct examination and matters affecting the credibility of the witness The
court may, in the exercise of discretion, permit inquiry into
additional matters as if on direct examination
(c) L e a d i n g q u e s t i o n s . Leading questions should not be
used on the direct examination of a witness except as may be
necessary to develop the witness' testimony Ordinarily leading questions should be permitted on cross examination
When a party calls a hostile witness, an adverse party, or a
witness identified with an adverse party, interrogation ma> be
by leading questions
(Amended effective October 1, 1992 )
R u l e 612. W r i t i n g u s e d to r e f r e s h m e m o r y
If a witness uses a writing to refresh (he witness memory
for the purpose of testifying, either
'

(1) while testifying, or
(2) before testifying, if the court in its d i s c r e t i o n ^
mines it is necessary in the interests of justice,
^
an adverse part} is entitled to have the writing prodiw
the hearing, to inspect it, to cross examine the \y5
thereon and to introduce in evidence those portions -«&
i elate to the testimony of the witness If it is claimed that
writing contains matters not related to the subject mattJS
the testimony the court shall examine the wnting m caim^
excise an) portions not so related, and order delivery 0 f^j ?
remainder to the party entitled thereto Any portion withy!
over objections shall be preserved and made available toflj
appellate court in the event of an appeal If a wnting la ?J
produced or delivered pursuant to order under this rule tiJ
court shall make any order justice requires, except that?
criminal cases when the prosecution elects not to comply tk
order shall be one striking the testimony or, if the court info
discretion determines that the interests of justice so reqmn
declaring a mistrial
(Amended effective October 1, 1992 )
R u l e 613. P r i o r s t a t e m e n t s of w i t n e s s e s .
(a) E x a m i n i n g w i t n e s s c o n c e r n i n g p r i o r statement.^
examining a witness concerning a prior statement made to
the w ltness, whether written or not, the statement need notbe
shown nor its contents disclosed to the witness at that time,
but on request the same shall be shown or disclosed to
opposing counsel
(b) E x t r i n s i c e v i d e n c e of p r i o r i n c o n s i s t e n t stat*
m e n t of u l t n e s s . Extrinsic evidence of a pnor inconsistent
statement b> a witness is not admissible unless the witness^
afforded an opportunity to explain or deny the same and list
opposite partv is afforded an opportunity to interrogate tht
witness thereon, or the interests of justice otherwise require.
Th
p vision does not apph to admissions of a parH
opp^n^nt as defined in Rult jOUd)(2)
(Amendf d effective October 1, 1992 )
Rule 614 C a l l i n g a n d i n t e r r o g a t i o n of witnesses by
court.
(a) C a l l i n g by c o u r t . The court may, on its own motion at
at the suggestion of a party, call witnesses, and all parties an
entitled to cross examine witnesses thus called
(b) I n t e r r o g a t i o n by c o u r t . The court may lnterrogaB
witnesses, whether called by itself or by a party
(c) O b j e c t i o n s . Objections to the calling of witnesses by th
court or to mteirogation by it may be made at the time or*
the next available opportunity when the jury is not present
R u l e 615. E x c l u s i o n of w i t n e s s e s .
(1) At the request of a party the court shall order witness*
excluded so that they cannot hear the testimony of otto
witnesses, and it may make the order on its own motion Ta
rule does not authorize exclusion of
(a) a party who is a natural person,
(b) an officer or employee of a party which is not
natural person designated as its representative by'
attorney,
tc) a person whose presence is shown by a party to
essential to the presentation of the party's cause, or
(d) an adult victim in a criminal trial where the pr
ecutor agrees with the victim's presence
(2) The court may exclude or excuse a victim fr° m
courtroom if the victim becomes disruptive
(3) An adult victim in a criminal trial who elects to
present in the courtroom may not be prevented from tes&
mg even after being present and having heard other t£
monv
(Amended effective October 1, 1992 )
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